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PREFACE 
This paper has been produced as part of IIASA's hazardous waste manage- 
ment work, which is the main component of the Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies project. The overall aim of this work. reflected in this 
paper, is to systematize our understanding of interactions between institu- 
tional and technical factors in policy making and implementation. The 
influence of institutional processes upon technical knowledge built into policy 
has been increasingly recognized. However, it has yet to be adequately clarified 
in comparative research on different regulatory systems. Institutional struc- 
tures canot be easily transplanted from one culture to another. Nevertheless, 
through the normal flux of policy, institutional development slowly occurs any- 
way, in more or less ad hoc fashion. Comparative insight may help to direct 
reflection and adaptation in more deliberate and constructive ways. 
This paper forms one draft chapter of an intended book on hazardous waste 
management. The reader will therefore notice references to  other draft 
chapters in this study which are also being circulated separately, and which are 
available from IIASA A full list is given overleaf. At this stage the papers are 
drafts, and are not intended for publication in-present form. They are being 
circulated for review and revision. 
I would like to thank those policy makers and others who have exchanged 
papers and information with us, and those who generously gave of their time 
and experience in the many interviews which form a substantial input to this 
work A full list of acknowledgements will eventually be published. 
Brian Wynne 
Research Leader 
Institutional Settings and 
Environmental Policies 
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CHAPTW THREE: 
Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes 
Brian Wynne 
This Chapter examines the application of risk analysis to toxic chemicals, 
especially to hazardous chemical wastes. I t  therefore brings together the more 
general perspective of Chapter 2 with the specific characteristics of toxic 
chemicals and their environmental distributions, and with the specific proper- 
ties of hazardous waste management as an industrial-social-environmental 
"arena" in which toxic chemicals are produced. moved. transformed and have 
effects. The particular analytical focus is the dilemma of attempting to plug 
loopholes by having precise technical standards of universal application, yet to 
optimize risk management by tailoring regulations to specific waste disposi- 
tions and situations. is created by the  embedded situational variations and 
uncertainties of the kind analyzed in the last (and next) chapter, and by the 
contradictory institutional needs of regulation (varying in different countries) 
for standardization and third-party accountability. 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
Risk Assessment (RA) has developed and diversified from its earlier focus 
upon compound mechanical failures and plant emissions; more institutional- 
ized public health concern in legislation and associated regulatory bodies has 
meant its natural extension into the areas of environmental pathways and 
human or environmental end-effects [I.]. Although some disciplines relevant to  
the latter -for example toxicology - have long traditions, their ethos has often 
been clinical and individual, and badly suited to questions of collective public 
health effects. Within RA this has led to fundamental conflicts with younger dis- 
ciplines such as epidemiology, which have developed their methods and 
approaches within the new climate of institutional needs and aims [2]. 
Although formal RA was dominated in the  1950s and 80s by 'mechanical 
system' analysis, this period also saw the beginnings of more systematic 
environmental exposure and dose-effect analysis. Indeed attempts systemati- 
cally to gather evidence and define the  risk associated with radioactive expo- 
sures had begun with the establishment of the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection (ICRP) in 1927 [3]. However this began as a concern by 
clinical radiologists about individual risks to radiologists and patients in clini- 
cal X-ray therapy and diagnosis. This effort took on a new impetus and reorgan- 
ization in the 1950s, following the industrialization of nuclear energy and a 
shift of concern towards collective public and work-force exposures and risks. 
Early work in this field was dominated by pharmacology and experimental 
pathology (as well as the earlier clinical traditions), from which chemical toxi- 
cology also developed. The established paradigm was built around the  simple 
concept of a damage threshold as acute doses and associated effects (e.g., gross 
tissue damage) were reduced. Thus approaches to risk and regulation e.g. in 
early ICRP standards setting involved short term experiments to establish "no 
observable effects levels" (NOEL'S) for such gross effects. These were then con- 
verted straightforwardly into maximum allowed exposure limits by the applica- 
tion of a safety factor, typically 10 for work-forces or 100 for external dose lim- 
its. The implication of this threshold approach was that  such exposure limits 
involved zero r isk 
Initially even radiation in-duced carcinogenesis was also thought to be asso- 
ciated with only gross tissue damage. but with the observation of radio 
mutagenesis and the somatic cell mutation theory of ~ a r c i n o ~ e n e s i s  (early ver- 
sion of the "one-hit" model of carcinogenesis), the idea became established that  
the origins of cancer a t  least lie in more micro-scale damage, unfolding only 
over long-term into clinical effects. to far more sensitive entities such as 
genes. This suggested that there may well be no dose threshold for health dam- 
age including mortality, so that  no "zero risk" standard could exist. However, 
long latency periods were now associated with observation of effects and risks. 
I t  was through the gradual though contested establishment of this no 
threshold idea that RA in its presently recognized form developed [4]. In this 
new form, standards-setting took on a concern for risic-benefit balancing, on 
the grounds that if no zero risk levels of exposure could be found, and zero 
exposure to most agents was impracticable, a level of exposure and correspond- 
ing risk would have to  be set  which made an acceptable trade off between risk 
and the costs of reducing exposures to achieve an acceptably low level of risk. 
Thus all the procedures of optimization, evaluation of "best available" control 
technologies, elaborate analysis of low dose-effect relationships for various 
agents, and concerns for public distributions and acceptance of risk entered 
into regulatory agendas and processes. 
As compared to radiation risk assessment, two major factors further com- 
plicated RA for chemicals. 
(i) exposure pathways to evaluate doses for radiation are multivariate 
and complex enough, but a t  least radiation exposure is to relatively 
few different kinds of agent (e.g., a-emitters, p-emitters, y-emitters) 
from r e l a t i v e l y  few nuclear plants or other exposure events (e.g., A- 
bomb explosion, or diagnostic/therapeutic programs). These have 
also often been in discrete events, and sufficiently large and definable 
populations to provide reasonable epidemiological data for dose-effect 
evaluation. Chemicals themselves. and their forms of environmental 
release are so multivariate and diffuse that they present different ord- 
ers of magnitude of complexity even to identify exposure pathways 
and populations le t  alone to begin to attach quantitative estimates to 
them. 
(ii) radiation penetrates tissue and delivers energy in relatively simple, 
well understood ways, so that  specific organ or tissue doses can be cal- 
culated from external exposure d e c t s .  (Not all is physical penetra- 
tion and distribution of course - e.g.. metabolic uptake movement and 
residence in the body of particulate radiation. especially a-emitters 
which deliver highly localized doses. has to  be understood.) The same 
is far from true for most chemicals. so that specific organ or tissue 
doses cannot be calculated even from known e z p o s u r e  levels. 
When we consider chemicals exposures from wastes this ignorance and 
complexity is expanded even more, because the chemical compositions, points 
of generation and disposal, and subsequent mixing of wastes are frequently 
badly known a t  best. 
Thus in both dimensions of 'external' RA, exposure pathways (including 
points and focus of emission) and dose-effect estimations, (including the judg- 
ment of which possible effects to explore) hazardous waste management is 
severely underdeveloped [5]. Probabilistic estimations have to give way to 
downright inestimability. Some regulatory purposes can avoid some of these 
lacunae: for example the ranking of intrinsic hazard of chemicals can proceed 
without having to analyze situational exposure routes and magnitudes, and 
evaluating different disposal options and exposures for the same chemical can 
assume the same dose-effect relationship. On the other hand ignorance within 
each may multiply; for example if an existing inhalation pathway for a given 
chemical is not identified and inhalation creates more damage than say inges- 
tion because of different metabolic uptake, then the mistake begun by 
ignorance in one dimension is multiplied by ignorance in the other. 
One can put the state of development of chemicals RA in perspective by 
observing that it  has had far less attention devoted to it  than nuclear radiation 
RA, and is far more diverse and ill-defined an area [6]; yet even with this rela- 
tively huge attention devoted to it, for decades, the  low dose radiation risk issue 
defies scientific definition and consensus. Thus in its review between 1976 and 
1980 [7] the US National Academy of Sciences, Biological Effects of Ionising 
Radiation (BEIR 111) Committee in the end split irreconcilably over carcinogenic 
risks, and had to conclude that ignorance was still so deep that no single clear 
inference was scientiflcally warranted at doses beneath 10 rad, the very area of 
public health and regulatory concern. 
The environmental-biological side of the Aeld is therefore in its infancy - 
indeed in certain respects it becomes more infant as time passes, because the 
rate of new chemicals and mixtures arising, combined with the rate of 'new' 
exposures from 'old' chemicals (e.g., past dumps) is greater than the rate of 
adequate knowledge generation to understand better their environmental and 
health implications. At  the Love Canal waste dump for example, after a colossal 
analytical program involving over half a million data points [8], over 400 
different chemicals were eventually identified, with the following characteris- 
tics: 
% of total 
mutagens 
carcinogens 13 
embryo toxicants (teratogens) 7 
hepato toxicants (liver) 10 
neurotoxicants (brain) 16 
renal toxicants (kidney) 10 
pulmonary toxicants (lung) 9 
as estimated from a cursory literature survey on animal and in vitro testing. 
However over 50% of the  chemicals identified had no research record 
against them a t  all - their properties were simply unknown, even though they 
had been produced and disposed of up to 30-40 years ago. Even the data on the 
rest  were so uncertain that the EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group judged that  
only 4% (15 of 400) of the chemicals found could be given reasonably secure 
individual risk estimates. 
The field is in a kind of intellectual 'poverty trap' in that,  because i t  is so 
far behind and demands for howledge are nearly always created under condi- 
tions of urgency, the kind of 'research' performed is closely tied to those 
urgent, retrospective regulatory demands. This draws attention and resources 
from more carefully conceived fundamental research which just because i t  is 
pitched a t  a more general level, when it does advance may solve problems in 
larger classes - it is more anticipatory. There is an understandable tendency 
for regulatory bodies (and regulated bodies for that matter) only to be con- 
cerned with 'science' which corresponds to their immediate legal and regula- 
tory needs, but this is not necessarily equivalent to the best RA or science for 
policy generally. 
In principle one can employ the same kind of 'fault,' or event-tree analysis 
to clarify different branching pathways, probabilities and potential doses and 
effects in this "environmental and health" domain as in the more traditional 
'mechanical domain.' Although the balance of analysis shifts towards more bio- 
logical, chemical and behavioral factors, these are not absent in "mechanical 
system" risk analyses (e.g.. containment of biological hazards in enzyme deter- 
gent or other biotechnology plant). However the regions of uncertainty 
ignorance and heterogeneity, including range of diverse 
behavioral-institutional factors, become generally even larger in the chemi- 
cals domain, than before. The number of potential end points let alone expo- 
sure routes to analyze even just for human health is huge.* 
One basic complication about hazardous waste management is tha t  it 
involves a flexible .range of various behavioural processes and mechanical sys- 
tems (in treatment, transport and disposal technologies and infrastructures) 
but these only beg in  to  open up  a t  the point where nnt?lral process environ- 
mental and health RA begins for conventional dispersive waste emission, 
namely a t  the point of w a s t e  o u t p u t  from other industrial plant. Furthermore 
except in a few places (e.g., Bavaria, Denmark) the T & D technological struc- 
ture is not under the design and control of regulatory bodies performing or 
applying RA. 
This leads us to  consider the  different regulatory nodes where regulatory 
information might be gathered and control applied [9]. We will then examine 
the possible decision-levels a t  which regulatory decision making (even if in 
practice made by industrial management, i t  may be under specific regulatory 
influence) might in principle use RA. 
The various possible points of regulation and monitoring in hazardous 
waste management are indicated in table 2. I t  is immediately apparent how 
much the overall picture is complicated by the fact that  unlike conventional 
pollution, hazardous waste is packaged waste, therefore controlled and 
transferred by human intermediaries. 
* See for illustration. Table I. 
TABLE I. Examples to show range of potential human health end points to ex- 
amine in chemicals risk assessment (non-exhaustive). 
REPRODUCTIVE 
Sexual dysfunction 
decreased libido 
impotence 
Sperm abnormalities 
decreased number 
decreased motility 
abnormal morphology 
Sub-fecundity 
abnormal gonads, ducts, or external genitalia 
abnormal pubertal development 
infertility (of male or female origin) 
amenorrhea 
anovulatory cycles 
delay in conception 
Illness during pregnancy and parturition 
toxenia 
hemorrhage 
Early fetal loss (to 28 weeks) and stillbirth 
intrapartum death 
death in first week 
Decreased birthweight 
Gestational age a t  delivery 
prematurity 
postmaturity 
Altered sex ratio 
Multiple births 
Birth defects 
maj or/minor 
Chromosome abnormalities (detected in early fetuses. through amniocentesis, 
in perinatal deaths, in livebirths) 
Infant mortality 
Childhood morbidity 
Childhood malignancies 
Age a t  menopause 
Many of these categories interact in different ways, e.g., observations at one level may by symptoms 
of 'observations' at another. 
NEUROTOXIC 
Various tissue toxic attack - axons, neurons, myelin, glin, blood vessels 
Distal axonopathy -various sites 
Vibration sensation 
Motor nerve conduction 
Peripheral neuropathy 
Sensory conduction 
Cranial, spinal, lemniscal and thalamo-cortial nerve activity 
Toxic encephalopathy - convulsions, hallucinations 
InAamations 
(Pigmentation changes) 
Tremor 
GENETIC 
(biochemical) 
altered protein electrophoretic mobility 
altered enzyme function 
lactic dehydrogenaze isozymes 
(chromosomal) 
sister chromatid exchanges (different cells and parts of cell cycle) 
chromosomal aberrations and breaks 
micronuclei formation 
(sperm) 
abnormal morphology 
CARCINOGENESIS 
Various sites and kinds of tumour 
"ASYMPTOTIC" DISEASES 
Reduced performance of normal functions -perceptual, memory, mo- 
tor skills, reflexes, balance, intelligence, problem solving, attention 
levels, sleep, etc., etc. 
Many of these categories interact in different ways, e.g., observations at one level may by 
sgmptoms of 'observations' at another. 
POSSIBLE DECISION-LEVEIS 
1. Roduc t  a d  process design - integrating waste disposal implications into 
new investment decisions. 
Ideally, a Risk Assessment scheme for chemical wastes would begin far 
'upstream' from normal points of application. a t  the stage of industrial 
process-design (see F'igure 1, chapter one). Thus not only conventional input 
factors (materials, capital, energy) and commercial product compositions and 
yields would be calculated, but also all potentially harmful entailments, either 
as by-products from the process, or after use (including possible transforma- 
tions) and discarding of the commercial products themselves. This approach is 
recognized as the ultimate regulatory ideal. It is also accepted by some [lo]  as 
in industry's best interest, since i t  might prevent some hazardous materials 
(e.g.. PCB's or 2,4,5-T) from ever becoming downstream 'wastes' where they 
then lead to regulatory reactions which inevitably threaten by-then established 
production (and use) commitments. In Hungary the government regularly 
analyzes 'internal' industrial data (see Hungarian case study), but in less 
centrally-planned economies industry strongly resists even external 
information-gathering, let alone external direction of plant and process deci- 
sions. 
The main problem with a regulatory strategy a t  this level is that the more 
comprehensive the attempted risk-analytical net, not only the more political 
conflict does it draw in (e.g.. direct interference in industrial decision making), 
but the more ignorance and uncertainty there is about the key decision factors 
-possible consequences of different upstream decisions. 
TABLF. 2: Regulatory nodes. information and instruments for hazardous waste management. 
REGULATORY NODE 
PRODUCTION PROCESS 
WASTE ARISINGS 
- FACTORY GATE 
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
and SPECIFIC 
CONSIGNMENTS 
T&DPLANT 
RECEIPTS 
T&DPLANT 
OPERATION 
(+ DESIGN?) 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MEDIA AMBIENT 
SPECIFIC ENVIRON- 
MENTAL END-POIIUTS 
e.g. AQUIFERS, 
POPULATIONS 
HUMAN DOSES & 
EFFECTS 
REGULATORY ACTION POSSIBLE 
Dictate procesm choice and dedgn 
Tax/waste codm enough to influenoe 
proceaa deoidons. 
Prohibit production of some wastes 
Waste tnx 
Classify and tag some wastes to  
minimal levels of T & D 
Regulator act8 as  transporter 
Licence transporters 
Specify design standards 
for transport 
Licence plants t o  receive only 
specified wastes 
Specific plant performace (& design) 
criteria, e.g., discharge limits 
+ prohibition of some wastes. 
Ambient concentration limits - 
air, water, soil, etc. 
Specific concentration limits 
calculated, e.g. as human dose limit 
equivalents (+ safety factor) 
"derived working limits" DWL'a 
Dose-limits - individual 
or population maxima. 
specific tissue and organ 
contamination limits. 
MONITORING OR ANALYSIS 
Inputs, procew design, 
aste streams, intermediatea 
Volume, compodtion, 
(e.g., packaging) of wrmte 
ansings - Internal treatment 
- external treatment 
Monitor consignments, frequency 
volume, composition reported 
and actual destinations 
Analyze wade receipts 
a t  T & D plant 
Rant omissions -air, 
water, (leachate, surface), 
soil, dperators 
Analyze which media most 
indicative, monitor 
contamination of these. 
Monitor potentially affected 
populations or critical groups 
INFORMATION NEEDED 
Compodtfon and interactions in 
process, to estimate wade stream8 
Actual re reported final 
dedinations 
Intermediate transfers 
re-loads, mixing, storage, etc. 
Prohibit some combinations 
Conpomition, volumes, origins 
physical state of wastes received 
Emission ratee t o  air (stack monitors); 
composition of leachate, surface 
water, operating environment 
Contamination levels of media, 
physical and qhernical process 
of environmental movement 
and distribution. 
Full range of health effects 
possibilities (see Table 1); 
(incl, workforce) 
Thus, for example whilst it may be in industry's best interest in principle 
to know before i t  makes any more commitments, whether a given process being 
contemplated a t  a conceptual design stage will produce unacceptably hazar- 
dous materials, in reality there are so many uncertainties and options in the 
passage from conceptual design and early risk indicators, to eventual effects. 
Furthermore these uncertainties are both technical ("further tests may show it 
as not so bad"; "we may develop a neutralization or destruction technique") and 
social ("we can influence the regulatory interpretation of technical data, or pol- 
itical attitudes to regulation"; "we can trust landfill operators always to per- 
form carefully"). 
The interested party is very influential in the social management of such 
uncertainties and intermediate downstream decisions. Therefore it may well 
decide in private, that  early, at-that-stage inevitably ambiguous risk indicators 
showing possible hazards, may be gambled against the potential commercial 
benefits of the new process or product, and the calculated possibilities of 
achieving a happy regulatory outcome 
In any case the point is that it is impossible to delineate downstream 
effects of various upstream decision options because the downstream branches 
of each upstream decision diversify enough to potentially overlap and mask any 
clear discrimination between effects of different upstream options. (This is a 
re-statement of the truism that  policy is always made in incremental steps 
[ll]. It cannot always be assumed that  this is a less rational response to uncer- 
tainties than the approach which demands extensive analysis as the deter- 
minant of every decision.) 
2. Production adaptation to reduce wastes  or specific toxicities 
This is effectively a special case of 1, since there is no clear-cut line 
between a wholesale production change, and large adaptations. Smaller 
'adaptations' may range all the  way down to e.g. in-plant waste-stream dewater- 
ing to reduce waste volume and mobility. Adaptation however implies a prior 
commitment to a given product and process a t  the  level of conceptual design. 
Waste RA here could mean enlarging normal optimization decisions about plant 
details to include differential costs (if any) associated with different hazardous 
waste implications of the options alongside the conventional cost benefit fac- 
tors. This would remain an in-house issue for industrial management and the 
upstream effects of any external, downstream signals from regulatory bodies 
would be complicated a n d  diffused by the other dimensions of concern to  indus- 
trial decision makers. 
Quite apart from confidentiality problems, industrial processes are usually 
not unitary but produce multiple waste streams, and even within regular daily 
operating conditions a process's waste composition will fluctuate quite 
significantly ("some waste streams go into and out of the  hazardous category 
several times per shift" [12]). Therefore the degree of specificity and accounta- 
bility of this level of RA is always likely to be limited. Many industrial processes 
are simply not amenable to  other than crude prediction of what chemical 
wastes they will produce; and by the time empirical examination can be made, 
for a full RA, commitments to the process are established - t h e  familiar tech- 
nological risk di lemma 
3. Given a c e r t a i n  w a s t e  a r i s ing ,  what t r e a t m e n t  a n d  d i sposa l  o p t i o n  should it 
rece ive?  
At this level, (as it were a t  the factory gate with the gate closed and all 
inside an inscrutable 'black box'), the  aim is to determine the  'intrinsic' pro- 
perties of the waste as i t  stands, and match its hazards to the cheapest 
effective technical option calculated to reduce those hazards to 'acceptable' 
levels. As already noted, even bowing what is there is a big problem. 
Risk assessment for 'intrinsic' hazardous characteristics has to be comple- 
mented by risk assessment of different T & D routes t o  evaluate if those intrin- 
sic hazards can be acceptably reduced (a t  'acceptable' cost), and if so,what is 
the most cost-effective means. There are two basic loopholes in this approach: 
(i) even assuming risk analysis could evaluate clearly the  optimal T & D 
. route for a given waste, i t  does not consider the  risks of the  desig- 
nated routes not being fulfilled; [see 5. below]; 
(ii) a general problem with risk analysis, that  the  uncertainties in the 
costs and effects of different options dwarf anything but crude com- 
parative information, so that  in practice, management of the  interpre- 
tation of risks and costs can determine what is 'analyzed' as optimal; 
in other words the  large uncertainties allow 'analysis' to  be manipu- 
lated (not necessarily deliberately) so as t o  give apparently objective 
justification to  more pragmatic prior commitments to  different T & D 
options. 
Two immediate situational factors give rise to  a special case of level 3, 
namely: 
4. Q i v e n a c e r t a i n u r a s t e  a r i s i n g i n a c e r t a i n p l a c e ,  w h a t p r a c t i c a l l y e z i s t i n g  
t r e a t m e n t  and  disposal op t ion  shnvld it receive? 
Whereas 3 might be used, ideally, for planning a T & D infrastructure, 4 
may more reflect real decision situations. The US EPA, which is committed to  
the  greater use of formal RA in regulation, has been developing an integrated 
model which at tempts to  match and optimize combinations of Waste- 
Environment-Technology (WET Model) for different r isklcost  objective functions 
using linear programming [13]. The model's developers recognize that  in 
aggregating many factors (for example t o  score all possible human health 
effects for an initial 140 different chemicals on a single scale), this risk 
assessment model is a very crude cut. Nevertheless i t  i s  intended tha t  i t  will 
systematically identify combinations of wastes, environments and technologies 
where regulation should increase or  decrease in resolution, and a t  t he  limits, 
where total prohibitions or non-regulation should occur. As "a broad policy 
planning tool ... incapable of developing and revising specific regulations," [14] 
the  WET RA is essentially the  first, crude s tep  of a step-wise regulatory strategy 
trying to  see where analytical attention should be focused in a situation where 
regulatory attention and resources are far outstripped by the  magnitude and 
complexity of t he  available problems. 
In principle, WET matching should optimize the  situatonal conditions 
( t reatment ,  transformation and disposal, containment. isolation, etc.) and 
hazards from the  intrinsic hazards of a given waste, t hus  refining t h e  risk-cost 
trade off. In practice of course, the  apparent specificity of such an  analysis and 
decision is impossible because there a re  far too many and too varied wastes 
arising (let  alone possible environmental dispositions) for each to  be subject to  
control by clear-cut risk-cost assessment rules. But i t  is necessary t o  
remember tha t  however i t  is s t ructured in different systems, this is the impli- 
cit  aim. 
Thus regulatory approaches have at tempted t o  establish accepted frame- 
works for evaluating wastes for their intrinsic 'hazard,' then 'control' their 
routing towards 'hazard-limiting' T & D options. This can be done in various 
ways and to  different levels of determinism or specificity. One option is to  allow 
complete freedom of choice for the operator to  dispose of his wastes once 
classified, but  only within a given menu (which may be very large indeed, 
including export) of T &D operators whose facilities a re  licensed to  received a 
variously limited range of wastes. This involves a significant measure  of risk 
'control' from the T & D licensing end ( the back end), with a minimal 'intrinsic' 
hazard classification of wastes, from the generator end (the front end) and a 
large mediating middle ground of free enterprise. Insurance is attempted 
against ignorance of waste arisings by placing control emphasis a t  another, 
downstream regulatory node. RA here is essentially a complex mix, of minimal 
conditions at each end of the match -initial waste, and h a l  T & D -but allow- 
ing normal commercial processes in between, to optimize for all other factors 
(and perhaps more besides) which a risk management decision would include. 
This is the least deterministic form of regulation. In putting regulatory 
emphasis on T & D plant licensing but not upon what wastes arise, it  is also 
institutionally most distant from production process innovation, and least able 
to  influence that  phase. This kind of balance is in principle most nearly approx- 
imated by the UK, which has probably the least elaborated hazard classification 
for wastes, and the most strongly expressed dependence (even if decentralized, 
and in reality variable in quality) upon T & D site-facility licensing [15]. 
Two ways in which this balance can be changed are (i) by more elaborate 
front- end attempts to classify hazardous wastes, even to tag specific wastes to 
direct them. to specific kinds of T & D (or even specific T & D facilities). This is 
being tried in Austria, and is the subject of moves to establish it in FRG*; and 
(ii), to centralize licensing of T & D facilities to be more elaborate and specific 
in the kinds of wastes they are allowed to treat. The US EPA began in 1978 by 
considering that  i t  would issue centralized criteria of T & D plant design and 
performance, but had to relax these in 1981 to 'best engineering judgment' in 
case-by-case manner, requiring operators to perform justifying risk assess- 
ments [16]. The uncertainty of this approach for operators has caused EPA to 
retreat to general standards, this time for enuironmental performance of T & D 
facilities. 
In effect it is  partly establishkd already in Bavaria and Hesse. 
Both of these regulatory moves (i) and (ii) push the front and back ends of 
the system together, thus reducing the ill-defined middle. In .theory this would 
increase determinism, control and effective regulation. In practice it would 
reduce the coordination of the  system, which* is only viable if a large degree of 
freedom, thus regulatory indeterminism. is allowed to private enterprise in 
matching specific wastes to specific end-points. 
A key dilemma is whether adequate freedom to allow self-coordination in 
the middle does not also in practice inevitably entail too much freedom for 
industrial actors to interpret too variably the conditions (e.g., definition of 
"waste", or threshold concentration) of hazardous waste classification and facil- 
ity licenses which are the bases of regulation. The EPA WET model for example 
[17], does not seem to have any components for evaluating different behavioral 
responses of free operators to different regulatory strategies and signals (e.g., 
monitoring versus notification; taxes and subsidies, etc.). Yet these perceptual 
and behavioral differences may be critical to effective regulation. 
5. Given a certain waste  and a certain designated T & D facility, what are the 
r isks  of its not arriving, in its proper form? 
This could be broken down into accidental or purposive "misdirection." 
The former could involve accidents and spillage, unsafe mixing a t  an intermedi- 
ate collection point (e-g., cyanides with acids, which could release HCN, or phy- 
sical or chemical changes within the same waste during transport or storage. 
I t  is interesting that some regulatory bodies such as the UK feel that  
hazard lists and classification schemes are only necessary for the transport 
phase - although they have not taken steps to license hazardous waste tran- 
sport operators [le]. Trip-ticket notification systems are supposed to address 
except perhaps in comprehensive local systems (see chapter five) 
this "effective designation" problem, but i t  is widely accepted in practice that: 
the sheer volume of paperwork and coordination necessary; the dislocations 
between brief, unit paper descriptions and real world transport arrangements 
(e.g., 'season-ticketse aggregating many loads into one recorded consignment): 
and the time lag between actual transport and receipt of all copies of the paper- 
work by an agency; all mean that trip-ticket systems can at best be a retrospec- 
tive information gathering exercise, and not a form of real-time regulation. 
A further dimension of this RA level, also a part of the previous one, is that  
if transport is a significant risk-generating phase, either through spills or diver- 
sions, optimization of risk should contain an element of reduction of transport 
distances and frequency of transfers and handling. This happens to coincide 
with the fact that transport is a significant part of overall T & D costs, so i t  
becomes prominent in T & D decisions (unless costs differ widely between 
different T & D operators, as they sometimes do). 
This transport reduction factor has to be played off against the need to get 
a given waste to an 'adequate' facility, and the (technical and economic) 
benefits of large scale regional facilities against smaller local facilities, which 
implies longer average transport distances. This kind of regionalization option 
may further imply regular one-way cross-border flows of wastes, with conse- 
quent unpredictable political difficulties as well as extra possibilities of lack of 
coordination, so that  many decision factors. a t  other levels begin to dominate 
the transport issue. Thus as with other levels of Risk decision in this field, the 
boundaries of the problem crumble even as one tries to define its internal 
structure. Thus far, in practice, with few exceptions,* most decisions about 
disposition of different kinds of T & D facility have not even been made on any 
coherent policy grounds, let alone ones including systematic risk assessment. 
* e.8..  Denmark, Bavaria, Hesse and the planned Hungarian network. 
They are more the accumulated result of 'separate' ad hoc commercial calcula- 
tions. 
8. With a g i ven  se t  of w a s t e s  produced w i t h  a g i ven  geographical d is t r ibut ion,  
what s i t e  and what d e s i g n  of T & R fac i l i ty  should be established? 
Assuming that a decision to build a certain kind of T & D facility in a cer- 
tain region has been made, siting and design (including license conditions) 
become issues for regulatory involvement. Apart from the stage of general 
hazard classification lists, this seems to be the field in which risk assessment 
could be most useful. Siting and design issues interconnect because for exam- 
ple, lining, leachate collection and treatment, monitoring systems and other 
design aspects of a landfill will depend upon its precise site in relation to geol- 
ogy, hydrology, etc. An incinerator's siting may depend upon the nature of its 
aerial emissions, etc. 
The principle underlying the approach is to reduce the intrinsic hazard of 
any given waste to acceptable levels, by transforming its intrinsic character, by 
physical or chemical immobilization, or other forms of isolation so that  human 
or other exposures do not occur. "Acceptable levels" will often be conventional 
environmental media standards - air, water, MPC's or derived working limits in 
specific sensitive media (e.g., food-crops, fish, etc.) -but  they may also involve 
plant emissions limits or even specific design requirements. 
As indicated earlier, unless a system is structured institutionally so that 
waste arisings fall under the positive designation of the T & D facility manage- 
ment, there is no guarantee that  a risk assessment a t  this back end will be 
effectively used in harness with other economic and technical judgements. 
7.  &k assessment 01 past dumps. 
This is a somewhat separate issue from regulation of present hazardous 
waste management even though there  a re  overlaps in terms of public atti tudes, 
landfill analytical and monitoring techniques, environmental movements and 
public health effects. There a re  also direct interactions from the  soil clean up 
programs for past  dumps where large volumes of incinerated soils stripped of 
most but not all of their  contaminants still need to be landfilled a t  controlled 
sites. thus taking up  capacity needed from currently generated wastes. In gen- 
eral however, risk assessment for past dumps clean-up is only a t  t h e  first s tep 
of a stepwise process, attempting to develop criteria for prioritizing those sites 
most  in need of desperately limited clean up resources [19]. In view of the  
dimculties experienced in mobilizing designated funds, and the  huge escalation 
of clean up costs now tha t  they a re  based on some initial experience r a the r  
than  hopeful guesses [20], this selectivity of prioritization has become even 
more severe. As t h e  Love Canal case illustrated [21], the  same dominating 
ignorance and uncertainties pervade this aspect as real t ime management,  but  
t he  way in which past dumps a re  discovered makes the social t rauma of t h e  
uncertainties more immediate and dramatic. As will be discussed in chapter  7, 
for past dumps the re  is less mediation and containment by regulatory bureau- 
cracies of the surprises inherent  in such ignorance than there  is in the  case of 
'real-time' hazardous waste management.  
There a re  several basic issues threading the  question of what role RA might 
play in regulation for hazardous waste management. The main ones revolve 
around how intrinsic hazards a re  managed into specific 'situational' ones, and 
where responsibility/autonomy rests  for doing this. A related issue is the way in 
which decision rules  for RA and regulation are expressed - how formal and 
specific are  they, or conversely how informal, discretionary and situationally 
flexible? These questions take us into the  heart  of how authority is managed 
through the  use of formal scientific knowledge or less formal judgment in  RA 
for regulation. This balance in turn  relates, on the  one hand to institutional 
structures  of scientific advice, regulation and policy, and on the  other to  public 
atti tudes and  reactions. 
IGNORANCE, JUDGMENT AND SlTFWEE TESllNG 
As indicated in chapter 1, even where i t  is most  elaborate, regulatory 
attention for hazardous chemicals focuses upon only a small proportion of t h e  
available problem domain. Various factors combine to reduce the area of at ten-  
tion, especially the  vast and growing excess of chemicals and potential effects 
over available analytical resources. As analytical techniques become more 
powerful and  refined. e.g., chromosome damage techniques and various neuro- 
logical field techniques [22]. they ironically expand uncertainty because they  
move further  ahead of t he  ability to interpret  t he  meaning in te rms of causal 
factors and recognized health risks, of the  new observations they produce [23]. 
In t h e  RA of chemicals and chemical wastes therefore stepwise or tier- 
testing schemes have become normal currency, although their  s t ructure is far 
from fully defined [24]. I t  is also important to  distinguish initially between: (i) 
t ier testing, which is designed to  bring rational priorities t o  the  question of 
what t o  subject to  more refined, more expensive and  t ime consuming risk 
analysis; and (ii) stepwise huzard classifications, which at tempt to create  a 
hierarchy of increasingly s tr ic t  regulatory control for increasingly hazardous 
materials. or combinations of materials and situations. 
These two phases overlap, but a re  in principle distinct because the  first 
ought to  be only a preliminary t o  the second In reality, RA often advances no  
further  than  the  first phase, but is then confused with the  second. 
Tier Testing 
Given that  only a small fraction of all potentially harmful chemicals can be 
properly tested, the aim of tier testing is to first perform cheaper. more rapid 
and more crude screening tests on a wider range, in order to t ry to find out  
what to test  in more detail. One very important pragmatic limitation of the  
scope of such schemes is that they usually only apply to  newly introduced com- 
mercial chemicals 1251. Therefore those already in circulation or created anew 
in wastes are exempted unless particular ones are arbitrarily "chosen" and 
brought to attention dramatically, thus demanding analysis, as with PCB's, or 
a t  Love Canal, Gouderak and other dumps. Tier testing therefore by passes a 
first, greater  level of ignorance, particularly t rue  of hazardous wastes, which 
involves not even knowing what chemicals are where, in what form, to  even 
screen for more detailed risk testing. 
Given the  daunting range of potential adverse health effects to  test  for, and 
the  lack of reasonable scientific connection between rapid, acute effects and 
chronic, low level effects testing, the ordering of tests  is scientifically rather  
arbitrary. Whereas regulators present i t  as a rational means of optimizing 
regulatory knowledge within very limited resources, industry sees i t  as a 
rational means of cutting down regulation and thus costs of introducing new 
products [26]. Many different schemes have been proposed or used. A typical 
scheme is that  proposed for the US Toxic Substances Control Act by a "con- 
sensus group" of industry and professional environmental bodies, convened by 
the  Conservation Foundation 1271. This is organized into four Tiers, the  first 
being a review of primary chemical and physical properties such as chemical 
s tructure,  volatility, purity, solubility, partition coefficient. 
adsorption/desorption, stability. The second tier begins biological tests e.g. for 
acute toxicity (oral inhalation, dermal) in mammals, birds and fish. Given tha t  
each LDS0 value* is a statistical determination needing many data points, this 
already implies a lot of laboratory experiments. This t ier also entails plant and 
seed toxicity tests,  analysis of transformation and degradation processes, and 
short-term mutagenicity and carcinogenicity tes t s  such  a s  in &TO cell 
transformations. These include further  tes t s  with metabolic activating agents. 
Already, in  addition to escalating costs, requirements for standardized experi- 
mental designs and reproducible methods a re  involved. These are by no means 
easy to develop and establish in practice, even between technically experienced 
practitioners, and require elaborate development involving inter-laboratory 
comparisons and exchanges, thus  further  multiplying costs and  t ime scales. 
The third t ier  expands upon the  second, if tests  a t  t he  earlier level indicate 
the need. This goes into greater  detail and  "longer-term" typically 90-day tests,  
for subacute, chronic and teratogenic effects in vivo and in viiro, in a range of 
species and cell cultures.  Biodegradability, bioaccumulation and  other  
environmental movement/transformation tes t s  are  also required a t  this stage, 
so as  to  develop a picture of potential exposures under different conditions. 
If indications from the  previous t ie r  suggest it, t h e  final t ier  involves life- 
t ime chronic toxicity tes t s  in a t  least two mammalian species, with associated 
histopathological examinations, and further  mutagenicity tests. Neurological 
tests  in various species, life-cycle plant growth/reproduction tes t s  a re  also 
involved. Metabolic and environmental transportation studies are  required to 
include more examination of the  by-products of such  transformations, since 
these may be toxic even if the  parent chemical is not. 
As a pragmatic necessity, some kind of escalating se t  of tests  such a s  those 
outlined above is inevitable. However inevitability should not be confused with 
rationality (and risk control) in any stronger  sense. Merely listing t h e  
* Mean Lethal Dose t o  50% of subjects tested. 
escalating tests in this way gives no sense a t  all of the  vast array of large-scale 
and detailed experimental and interpretive uncertainties a t  every point. Furth- 
ermore the structuring of the burden of proof in the stepwise screening process 
means that  a chemical is exonerated from further tests unless it  gives some 
positive indication in the earlier tier. But earlier. acute tests  and effects for 
example, may not relate to chronic effects, which occur by different metabolic 
pathways. and ac t  upon different entities and functions from acute effects. 
Thus, such tiered testing schemes and experimental protocols are not a substi- 
tu te  for experience and judgment, nor will they overcome interpretive conflicts 
containing policy overtones despite the fact tha t  this is the way they are often 
viewed [28]. 
This is especially so when as often happens, t ier tests are framed as 
numerical scoring systems from risk assessment models which fit bureaucratic 
needs by assimilating various results of different test batteries into single 
weighted aggregate scales which are automatically calculated. Thus for exam- 
ple one such RA model 1291, attempting to distinguish degrees of hazard for 
wastes, has "a single value represent all types of effects from different types of 
cancers to different kinds of graded responses such as liver damage. The con- 
ceptual link ... is  the  probability of an incident per unit dose. A score of "2" on 
our scale, for example, is intended t o  represent roughly a 1 per cent risk of 
either contracting cancer or having an adverse effect from consuming 1 mg of 
pollutant per 1 Kg of body weight per day .... The model assumes ... that most 
reported MED's, or minimum effective doses correspond to a risk of about lo%." 
Such bureaucratization into one simple numerical dimension of basic qual- 
itative differences and diverse and interacting uncertainties is encouraged by 
organizational realities and a felt need for the  "objective" authority supposed to 
emanate from models [30]. However this method of ,harnessing science may 
actually obstruct ra ther  than encourage the  development and integration of 
be t t e r  more mature  and discriminating science in Rk Some experts have criti- 
cized the  hyper-mathematization of biology in bio-statistics with the  same con- 
cerns in mind. I t  is typical to find tha t  many of the  experimental tests,  let 
alone interpretations of results have to be [31] "done in the  hands of a master" 
to mean anything a t  all. Another widely acknowledged expert, MacKay, has  cri- 
ticized t h e  whole framework of stepwise testing and  ranking in RA as  a mis- 
begotten a t tempt  to  substitute for experience and  judgment [32]: 
Undoubtedly, "scoring," or  "rating," o r  "prioritizing" numerical 
schemes  will be developed, allegedly to assist in  identifying the  most 
hazardous substances. I t  i s  the  author's opinion that  such schemes 
a re  usually misleading and a re  often pursued only because of intellec- 
t ua l  laziness. There is no substitute for t h e  careful gathering and 
assimilation of reliable. physical-chemical, biological, and industrial 
da ta  by a broadly experienced group of well-informed and well- 
intent ioned individuals who can then  make a balanced judgment in 
which all t he  issues have been weighed subjectively. 
This defense of science as  craft  skill, incorporating many dimensions of 
taci t  experience, intuitive judgment and subtly negotiated intra-expert agree- 
men t s  is often counterposed to formal models and  methods. Yet formal models, 
ranking schemes and approaches also require implicit, informal judgments and 
inputs  to be viable, and at tempts  to  model may make more, not  less demands 
upon less accessible and accountable judgments. This issue arises again below 
and is discussed later  in connection with risk assessment decision rules. 
Stepwise ranking schemes for hazardous chemicals including wastes 
extend in two directions from the  kind of scheme outlined above. Firstly, even 
t o  en te r  t he  first gate. selection has to be made. Thus for example the 
Interagency Testing Committee (ITC) for t h e  US Toxic Substances Control Act 
was required in 1979 to provide a scoring system to  meet  a six-month congres- 
sional deadline, for the  full repertoire of 70,000 o r  so chemicals already in com- 
mercial circulation. This was to determine which of these should enter  into a 
more careful scheme akin to that outlined before. The group which conducted 
the scoring was itself forced to use a series of crude gates and selection princi- 
ples established ad hoc [33]. The key one was simply to borrow lists from exist- 
ing regulations in the hope that these had more definitive origins. Further- 
more, for all its heroic attempts to be definitive and explicit, the group repeat- 
edly had to bridge huge gaps of ignorance and uncertainty with subjective judg- 
ments. 
Secondly ,  the starting point for ranking of hazardous chemical goods is 
r e l a t i v e l y  well defined compared to hazardous wastes. The quantitative ranking 
process for hazardous goods either takes the approximately 500 new chemicals 
per year, cuts them down first to about 40, then down to the three to six per 
year which can actually be subjected to full STAR* testing; or as in the exercise 
above, it selected 900 from the 70,000 starting number, and worked these down 
in a similar way. Hazardous chemical wastes on the other hand are much less 
well h o w n  because, socially defined as wastes, their chemical compositions and 
purity have no positive economic value; they may also therefore be mixed and 
vary indiscriminately with unknown chemicals resulting from uncontrolled 
interactions. As Finnecy has noted [34], 
Firstly there are many thousands of possible constituents in a waste, 
and waste is v e r y  rarely even an approximately pure substance. 
Secondly waste is rarely ever completely analyzed by anyone. Rather, 
analyses (or estimates of one sort or another) are made of a few 
'significant' components while the rest of the waste is largely 
unidentified in anything other than general terms. 
When one adds to this the myriad, often unknown starting points of wastes, 
and their complex, also often unknown life cycles, the problem for a central 
regulatory body of knowing where and what to begin screening is larger still. 
Scientiflc & Technological Assessment & Review 
Even leaving aside for the moment this extra dimension of ignorance for 
hazardous wastes, it is worth quoting a t  length the reflections of a scientist 
involved in the ITC ranking exercise [35]: 
I would draw several conclusions from this exercise ... that the scheme 
that was used incorporated a very significant degree of scientific judg- 
ment a t  every step. A t  each screening step, the chemicals screened 
out were examined manually by experts and the scoring involved a t  
least as much scientific judgment as the use of objective data. ... tha t  
the scoring system which considered 15 factors and had a range of 0 
to 3 or 0 to 4. was at  least a s  complicated for each of the factors as was 
justified by the available data. I t  may in fact have been too compli- 
cated. It may have tried to divide the chemicals more finely than our 
knowledge would justify. F'rankly I believe that  any reasonable scoring 
system can handle hundreds of chemicals with no finer subdivision 
than 0 to 3, or zero, low, medium and high. ... that  the screening pro- 
cess was limited primarily and very severely by lack of data on most 
chemicals. In fact, I would say that, if for each of the 900 chemicals 
we had placed information on the seven factors into separate boxes, a t  
least two thirds of the  boxes would have remained empty. My conclu- 
sion is that the scoring process was not limited by scoring methodol- 
ogy or by any other screening methodology. I t  was limited by the lack 
of data. I would therefore suggest that elaborate scoring systems are 
not  justified a t  the present state of our knowledge. Until we have such 
more extensive data on most of the factors for which we have to  
screen, there is no point in developing elaborate scoring systems 
because they cannot be used. 
This expert recognized not only that  schemes and rankings apparently con- 
trolled by formal criteria actually required more  informal judgments rather 
than less, but also that RA ranking systems may conceal  ignorance rather than 
better define and systematically reduce it. The kind of streamlined "scientific 
knowledge" which such classifications require is easily confused with the  more 
fundamental scientific knowledge which embodies open gaps and conflicts, nor- 
mal qualifying dimensions, situational adjustments, and so on. Because i t  
tends to bury uncertainty, it cannot easily develop strategies to overcome or 
adapt to it. Regulatory systems may have to act us if howledge existed and 
ignorance were bounded. But the institutional processes concerned may con- 
fuse this necessity for regulatory "as if" confidence and associated 'howledge' 
with real scientific knowledge. 
DEGREES OF HAZARD AND SITUATIONAL RISK OPTIMIZATION 
Although RA begins with estimation of 'intrinsic' hazards, either of 
engineered plant or  chemicals or both, various situation-specific factors enter  
into regulatory risk management.  The basic aim is simply to  refine regulation 
to correspond with degrees of hazard in real cases r a the r  than with blanket 
worst-case scenarios. This RA refinement parallels t h e  regulatory at tempt to  
use risk benefit optimization* in tha t  in trying to make regulation more 
'efficient,' by tailoring defined risks to  varying specific situations, margins for 
uncertainty and  er ror  and  thus  of safety, are  also naturally reduced. This 
therefore implies t h e  need for a greater  regulatory ability to  define t h e  specific 
controlling properties of such varying situations. Such an assumption is highly 
problematic. 
'Intrinsic' risks of a chemical or  nuclear plant might be probabilities of 
given release ra tes  of harmful  agents. Situational factors such a s  environmen- 
tal attenuation, siting (proximity of populations; o ther  sensitive entities such 
as  drinking water); typical particle size, chemical form, etc., of releases: affect 
estimations of actual  situational risks. In the case of large scale plant, such as  
liquid gas terminals, t h e  releases and environmental pathways to be considered 
as  situational risk-qualifiers may be very few, usually to do with atmospheric 
dispersion character is t ics  of vapour clouds (liquid gas plant) or  particles 
(chemical and nuclear  plant). 
The definition of any  specific risk situation is basically identical to  the  
problem discussed earlier,  of defining the  relevant s t ructural  characteristics of 
a technological risk system. The examples of LEG terminal facilities and the 
use of 2.4.5-T as  a herbicide were given in Chapter 2. For hazardous wastes the  
* Though risk-benefit trades off decreasing risk/increasing containment against costs of 
achieving such decreases, degree of hazard schemes do not always proceed to the second 
stage of defining containment costs of situational risk reductions. 
risks of understating uncertainties and variations are greater because of 
scientific ignorance and greater  situational variation in this case. 
Various possible approaches exist to defining situational risk qualifyers and 
organizing these into regulatory degree of hazard schemes [36]. The usual 
assumption is that  more situation-specific risk definition identifies risk- 
r e d u c i n g  features which allow the severity of centralized regulation to  be 
relaxed to a minimal base line, supplementing i t  with the risk qualifying factors 
introduced by more autonomous, situation-specific oper a to r  e z p e r i e n c e  and 
good management practices. The former may be 'directly' regulated with 
specific rules etc., whilst the  latter may be only indirectly regulated (e.g., by 
economic incentives) or merely assumed to take place. 
However (as the  2,4,5-T case illustrates) i t  should be noted tha t  i t  is not 
necessarily the  case tha t  situational realities r e d u c e  risks. Whether laboratory 
experiments with individual pure components capture the "real, intrinsic" 
hazards of chemicals in environmental circulation is  questionable, and as men- 
tioned earlier, the distinction between the "intrinsic or natural" hazard of a 
substance and its situational hazard is not an objective distinction free from 
social determination and variability. Often, what is defined by one party as an 
i n t r i n s i c  hazard already contains unre~o~nized~assurn~tions about institutional 
factors which appear a s  natural to tha t  party, but which others see as question- 
able or false. 
Different regulatory systems construct different distributions of regulatory 
direct constraint and autonomous responsibility between 'universal' risk 
characteristics, and flexible situation specific realities [37]. For example if one 
inserts a t  the  beginning of a RA scheme, the  criterion "volume of production" 
or "potential exposure," only subject to this prior evaluation making any 
assessment of toxic and other 'intrinsic' hazards, this may produce a different 
profile of relative risks from a scheme which Arst evaluates intrinsic hazards, 
then begihs to introduce situation specific qualifyers. Different regulatory sys- 
tems may also draw the line of specific control a t  different levels, for example: 
(a) listing for universal control (e.g., registration) hazardous wastes with 
intrinsic hazardous characteristics, then taking account of say, 
volumes produced, physical form, typical concentrations of hazardous 
constituents, professionalism of industrial management, siting, etc. 
only in separate local decisions (e.g., plant licensing) about specific T 
& D practices; or alternatively, 
(b) exempting from primary listing those wastes, even if intrinsically 
hazardous, which are: not  produced in large volumes or concentra- 
tions; produced perhaps only by large, technicaljy well-endowed com- 
panies; or arise in aqueous form if they are mainly an inhalation risk; 
[38] etc. 
The regulatory argument in favor of this lat ter  approach is tha t  i t  slims 
down primary regulatory lists, thus  allowing more attention to  focus on the  
more intense hazards 1391. This coincides with the  industrial interest in more 
autonomy from regulation. Thus for example Dow Chemicals' critique of EPA 
hazard listings was tha t  i t  was based upon estimated intrinsic hazards of consti- 
tuents  only [40], hypothesizing for this purpose that  waste would be improperly 
managed. Dow proposed instead a stepwise degree of hazard scheme which 
placed estimated real exposures (including production volumes) a t  the front 
end, thus reducing the apparent risks in an "equivalent toxicity" measure. 
Likewise the European Chemicals' Industry Toxicological Research Institute, 
ECETOC, has advanced a three-tiered degree of hazard approach which com- 
bines intrinsic toxicity criteria with [41] "exposure conditions which 
correspond to those in man or where the relevance of the exposure conditions 
can be deduced." Thus again, situation specific factors are incorporated into 
the same standard degree of hazard regulatory scheme as intrinsic factors. 
This is typical of general European institutional processes which compound 
"intrinsic" scientific factors with extrinsic factors in informal mechanisms and 
imprecise, flexible 'technical' criteria [42]. These institutional mechanisms 
may involve joint advisory committees which deliberate in private and nego- 
tiate the particular weaving together of scientific and extrinsic factors, or 
implementation processes which allow case-by-case negotiation between regu- 
lated interests and enforcement bodies. 
In the UK, situational risk-qualifying factors for specific waste have been 
identified. such as [43]: 
where it  is 
quantity 
concentration of hazardous components 
physical form 
detailed environmental disposition (e.g., if a fine powder, is i t  open to 
wind dispersion; is i t  adsorbed strongly by clay surroundings) 
sensitivity and number of targets exposed to  it  
and lastly: 
"how damaging the hazardous effects are to  the target," i.e., intrinsic 
hazards of the  chemical constituents of the waste. 
The apparently "intrinsic hazard" list for regulatory control in Britain 
actually already incorporates informal judgments of many such situational fac- 
tors, and provisions are made for automatic testing to de-list specific wastes 
[44]. Whereas the U S  system specifies a list of controlled wastes and adds as a 
catch-all, several tests which all un l is ted  wastes must also pass in order to be 
exempt from control 1451, the UK system specifies a (much more compact) list. 
but gives several tests which wastes containing such listed compounds must fail 
in order to be inc luded .  Whereas the U S  system is designed to automatically 
i n c l u d e  u n l i s t e d  hazardous wastes, the  UK system is designed to automatically 
e z c l u d e  l i s t ed  wastes which in their specific circumstances are not deemed 
hazardous. (Although there is a procedure for de-listing wastes in the US, it is 
dauntingly elaborate and contains criteria of proof sufficiently stringent to 
intimidate most companies from even trying.) 
Situational Variables - Natural and Social 
In addition to the extra uncertainties and narrowed error margins of situa- 
tional variation, a further complication with the UK system and others which 
attempt to incorporate situation specific factors in actual hazard rankings, is 
that they risk confusing naturalistic risk factors with socially determined ones. 
This point is crucial and deserves close examination: 
I t  is common to talk of the "life cycle" of a hazardous waste as i t  passes 
from generation, via various phases including transformation, to "final" disposi- 
tions (see Chapter 1). In emphasizing the need to incorporate situational risk 
qualifying factors for example, it is observed that [46]: 
"hazardous waste may be hazardous in only one phase of its life cycle. 
Acid waste for example, may be hazardous only up to the point where 
i t  is neutralized before final disposal. Organic solvent waste may pose 
a hazard only until i t  is burnt in an incinerator." 
Notice however that these examples of "life-cycle changes," and situational 
risk reductions are not natural transformations such as biodegradation with 
time into harmless products. They are the results of deliberate human inter- 
ventions. I t  is precisely these which regulatory controls are there to first, 
define as necessary, and, second, enforce. In much of the policy discussion 
there is a tendency to confuse such behavioral components, which we cannot 
assume will occur naturally, with genuinely "natural" factors which may in 
some situations reduce exposures and risks from intrinsic 'worst cast' levels by 
attenuation or benign transformations. Even many of these however, must also 
be activated by deliberate human action, (e.g., to  site a landfill on thick clay 
and to allow only certain compounds to be filled), and are thus not natural in 
the sense that  they cannot be assumed automatically to  take place without 
regulatory control t o  ensure good management. 
As accumulating empirical research on real environmental regulatory 
implementation is showing, such proper management is not even ensured when 
'direct' regulatory statutes and bodies exist to "enforce" i t  [47]. Yet degree of 
hazard schemes incorporating situational factors often mix questionable 
assumptions about ideal behavior by the complex sets  of actors involved in 
\ 
hazardous waste, together with genuine physical environmental factors which 
may reduce real exposures (and thus damage) below theoretical worst case pos- 
sibilities. 
Much hazardous waste policy analysis argues tha t  environmental factors 
which (it is assumed) reduce exposures from 'worst case' possibilities should 
hold a more prominent place in risk assessments for regulation [48]. Underly- 
ing this argument is a feeling that  widespread publication of disquieting labora- 
tory evidence of toxic damage from a whole host of chemicals in the last decade 
or so has encouraged exaggeration of real risks and consequent over-regulation 
based upon "worst case" assumptions which neglect exposure-reducing reali- 
ties. The following arguments are typical [49]: 
Perhaps the most direct approach ...[ is] ... t o  assemble a list of toxic 
effects. along with a list of tests tha t  establish the presence or 
absence of those effects .... Such an exhaustive approach has been 
commonly required for food additives, pesticides, new human drugs 
and animal drugs. 
... While such an approach may define the  biological effects due to a 
substance, it is necessarily incomplete, since such information is only 
a part of what we need to know to define the actual hazard to health or 
the environment. 
... i t  is generally less expensive, more technically appropriate, and 
equally protective to evaluate the potential environmental impact to 
the degree necessary to make decisions on the degree of containment 
control based upon actual expected impact, ra ther  than treat  rou- 
tinely for worst case conditions in which it is assumed that  the toxi- 
city associated with a particular source extends for considerable time 
and distance. 
Reflecting this concern to modify an intrinsic risk approach with environ- 
mental risk attenuation/dilution factors, data frameworks stress criteria such 
as: 
production volumes, places, and durations 
modes of dispersion 
physical form and containment 
environmental transformation, absorption. partitioning, etc. 
proximity of populations (including eating and habits of environmen- 
tal usage) 
food-chains and other possible exposure routes and limiting factors 
likely exposure levels and durations. 
Risk analysis models and data frameworks combine exposure-related 
hypotheses and calculations with intrinsic effects estimates. A t  the same time 
strong arguments are made to incorporate such dimensions in formal regula- 
tion. These are supported by optimistic claims that [50]: 
there is emerging a capacity to predict the environmental fate of 
newly introduced chemicals by means of techniques such 
as ... evaluative models. Such techniques predict the likely compart- 
ments of the environment into which the contaminants will flow and 
accumulate, thus exposing biota and humans to toxic effects. 
However the insecure foundations of such beliefs are indicated by the fact 
that  the  same author admits later  that this same area "contains a vast number 
of species with varying and poorly understood interdependencies" in which yet 
again, "scientific knowledge severely lags behind regulatory needs" [51]. 
Even considering the physical-chemical and biological unknowns in the  
domain of environmental movements and exposures therefore, there are severe 
difficulties and risks involved in trying to optimize RA and regulation to varying 
situations, without destroying or over-stepping safety margins. This is t rue 
even for relatively pure, well-analyzed chemicals. For hazardous waste one 
must add to these the extra complications of badly known and more variable 
waste compositions, and semi-autonomous, ill-defined behavioral factors shar- 
ply affecting their physical dispositions and thus environmental conditions. 
The risks are especially sensitive to some of these behavioural factors. 
Thus the  whole issue of regulating risks characterised by such variety, in 
determinacy and regulator-ignorance may invite reconsideration of the optimi- 
zation approach in this particular policy field One institutional alternative 
may be the absorption of the  risks, wastes and T & D management responsibili- 
ties by regional public authorities which are essentially also the  regulators. 
This will be the subject of Chapter 5. In the next section we illustrate that  even 
in the highly controlled and artificially simplified context of scientific testing 
ignorance and indeterminacy of situational variations are  too great to allow 
credible standardisation. 
STANDARD TESTS AND SITUATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT - 
the EP Test As a Case Study 
Conventional scientific disciplines routinely have to reconcile the variabil- 
ity of specific cases and situations with the search for universal underlying con- 
stants and relationships. Regulation must  manage a similar reconciliation, but 
the principles and purposes of standardization for regulatory knowledge are  
different from those of science, even if they overlap. Conflicting pressures and 
contradictory strategic aims are  exposed a t  the  hear t  of regulatory science. 
If regulations embody key definitions of materials for control, such as  
"hazardous," "special." o r  "controlled," these a re  defined either by lists or  pro- 
perties or both. In order to define whether a given waste has a given property, 
clear criteria must  be deflned for each property, and standard, reliably repro- 
ducible tests  established. For properties such  as  flammability, corrosivity, etc., 
relatively simple indicators can be defined, e.g., flash-point, or  pH (though even 
these a re  not always valid). However i t  is for characteristics such as  toxicity or  
carcinogenicity tha t  the major difficulties arise. 
The first a r ea  of difficulty is identical to tha t  discussed above for all chemi- 
cals, even with well-defined compositions, t ha t  any standardized hazard cri- 
terion 
i s  not  technically valid for assessing the environmental hazard associ- 
a ted with solid wastes primarily because the transport and transfor- 
mation (environmental chemistry) of t h e  solids-associated contam- 
inants  can be markedly different for each specific environment, and 
usually play a dominant role in determining t h e  hazard associated 
with the introduction of solid into the  environment. The environmen- 
tal chemistry of contaminants is influenced by many factors ... and 
m u s t  therefore be evaluated on a site-specific and solid waste-specific 
basis [52] .  
I t  is important to note tha t  these situation specific arguments apply not  
only to the particular environmental conditions surrounding a waste in any 
given site, but also to the  variable condition of wastes themselves. Wastes 
which are  given t h e  same name in a hazard classification or list and which are 
thus  in regulatory te rms identical, usually vary in composition and physical 
form both between plants performing t h e  same process, and even from the  
same  plant over time. These variations may cause significant changes in  risk 
characteristics,  e.g., leaching properties for hazardous constituents. Even if 
the  chemical composition of different wastes was identical, changes in physical 
form such as particle size distribution, degree of aeration, etc., may radically 
affect the  release of hazardous constituents (and thus risks) in the  same 
environmental site. 
Despite the force of these arguments, regulatory bodies have understand- 
ably been tempted by the  opposite appeal of a single universal criterion and a 
corresponding standard test,  a t  least to characterize wastes initially as hazar- 
dous before going on to consider situation-specific variations. An apparently 
simple example of such standard criteria are concentration thresholds for 
listed constituents of wastes, with "s tandard  analytical methods for tests. A 
regulatory test for toxicity in the  US is the elutriate procedure, or EP Test. 
which is formally designated as a standard, statutory test to bring wastes which 
fail i t  under regulatory control. [53]. 
The EP test is designed to tes t  the leaching rates of potentially hazardous 
waste-constituents into water, so as to simulate releases from landfill sites. A 
"representative sample" of a waste is mixed with a solution (pH 5 acetic acid) 
supposed to represent typical landfill conditions, and the  leachate separated 
from this mixing is then analyzed for certain listed constituents. If these are 
present above a specified concentration, the waste is ofRcially hazardous. So 
f a r  the listed constituents are 14 chemicals or elements taken from water qual- 
ity regulations under the Clean Water Act. The concentration thresholds in the  
leachate are set a t  the standards for acceptable drinlang water quality multi- 
plied by an arbitrary factor of 100. This large situational factor is to allow for 
assumed further attenuation or dilution between leaching and escape from a 
waste-site, and possible eventual contamination of drinking water. 
As one expert has remarked 1541: 
The primary requirement  of a method t o  be used in making such an 
inherently expensive decision as  whether or not t he  leaching from a 
waste is hazardous or whether a disposal method is safe, is repeatabil- 
ity. Not just t h a t  one technician in one laboratory can  run  three 
replicates, and ge t  the  same answer. Ten technicians in ten  labora- 
tories must  be able to. 
Inter-laboratory precision and  repeatability is absolutely vital to regula- 
tory use of such standardized hazard classification tests.  The regulations 
therefore stipulate detailed methods which a re  obligatory for conducting such 
tests. Even so, the possibilities for methodological variations, even o n  the same 
sample, are very large and  still undefined. Some of t h e  factors which produce 
variable results a re  very subtle, and maybe not even consciously recognized as 
elements  of method by practit ioners themselves. These factors include the fol- 
lowing [ 5 5 ] :  
1. Leachate 
(a) precise purity and  composition 
(b) redox conditions (e.g., dissolved oxygen) 
(c) temperature,  
(d) pH, including buffering 
( e )  method of preparation and storage 
2. Batch or column (continuous) tes t  
3. Volume of sample 
4. Leachate - solid waste ratio 
5 .  Method, vigour and duration of agitation 
6. Method of addition of solution to  solid waste sample 
7. Mixing vessel material ,  design and even exact position 
8. Contact -agitation t ime 
9. Sample preparation, e.g., grinding, homogenization 
10. Organic contents  of waste sample 
11. Particle-size distribution, porosity, etc. 
12. Number of elutions performed per waste sample 
13. Leachate-solid separation method - centrifuge, settling, filtering - 
and time 
14. Preservation of samples before leaching 
15. Preservation of leachates after mixing and before analysis -freezing, 
drying, light exposure, time, etc. 
This is not  an  exhaustive list, but  i t  already presents formidable difficulties 
for precise repeatability. Some of these experimental factors have been 
specified in the  s tandard tes t  protocol, others have not. Even with the stand- 
ardized method, a n  interlaboratory evaluation program in 1979 found poor 
reproducibility even from standard laboratory samples. (In other  words, all the 
severe variations in sampling a real waste have been excluded.) Thus for exarn- 
ple the EP test  on sample fly ash coal burn waste for Arsenic leaching found a 
mean concentration of 0.227 ppm, but with a standard deviation of results of i 
0.226, i.e., * 100% uncertainty [56]! Chromium fared somewhat bet ter  a t  i 50%. 
Other standard tests,  all involving apparently precisely controlled statements 
of method, also showed such poor reproducibility tha t  even for  the same labora- 
tory sample, i t  has  been concluded that the EP tes t  is highly unreliable as a 
regulatory instrument .  Sampling variations introduce an even further dimen- 
sion of variability and uncertainty into the  at tempt t o  define the 'intrinsic' 
hazard of a waste. 
It  is important  to  understand the several levels of variability which accu- 
mulate: 
(a) Is the  'standard laboratory sample' a representative sample of a 
re a1 waste? 
(b) Is the 'standard sample' taken by any given laboratory the  same 
as the  'standard sample' taken by another laboratory? 
(c) Is the 'standard sample' taken by a given laboratory the  same as 
that  taken a t  another time by the same laboratory. 
2. Laboratory methods and detailed practices affecting leaching - the  
same three questions as for 1 apply. 
3. Chemical analysis of a standard leachate from the experimental leach 
test is  also highly variable, especially a t  the  low levels of concentra- 
tion relevant. The same interlaboratory program mentioned above 
[57]  found that  with the  same leachate sample and the same analyti- 
cal technique, analytical results could vary by &loo% in this concen- 
tration range. 
As Collins and others have documented, experimental reproducibility even 
for 'simple' experiments involves many tacit, craft aspects of detailed labora- 
tory practice which are  barely, if a t  all specifiable [58 ] .  Thus reliable standardi- 
zation for consistent and secure regulation is far more difficult than usually 
recognized, and in practice prohibitively expensive, even if achievable in princi- 
ple. 
The potential variations outlined above incorporate two separate kinds of 
uncertainty. Firstly there is tha t  resulting from variation in detailed labora- 
tory practices, including sampling and analysis. Secondly there is the uncer- 
tainty as to whether the standard labo?-atory test  conditions laid down in the  
at tempt to gain clarity and reproducibility bear any resemblance to the  real 
conditions in a waste. This is not only a question of representative sampling,, 
but also of whether e.g. a specific agitation method and duration mandated for 
the test is a realistic simulation of solid-liquid mixing and leaching in a real 
landfill. 
Clearly, a laboratory test  protocol to be practical must  simplify conditions 
from its real-world counterpart; and to be valid it must identify the factors and 
detailed experimental conditions which match the key real factors affecting 
real leaching of hazardous constituents from a landfill. Yet these are poorly 
understood even in general, let alone in the  fantastic variety of specific sites, 
their  particular properties (which vary within one landfill and over time), waste 
inventories and management practices. Nor do the possible differences 
between laboratory tests and real conditions always produce over-conservative 
regulatory results. The leachate pH specified in the  EP test  for example, is 5, to 
represent what is thought to be a worst-case scenario, of disposal of an indus- 
trial waste with municipal waste. Yet compounds of some toxic metals for 
example arsenic, selenium and chromium are  more soluble, therefore subject 
to  greater leaching, in the  alkaline conditions which prevail in some landfills. 
Other landfills are much more acid than pH 5. The range of pH found in a study 
of U S  landfills was 1.5 - 9.5 1591. A variety of other uncontrolled and poorly 
understood factors in different waste-site conditions could similarly lead t o  
under-estimations of real risks by the  standard testing protocol. 
To summarise, even at tempts to standardise central regulatory criteria 
fail because of situational variations in the highly controlled process of labora- 
tory scientific testing. Yet this is an artificially simplified sample, and science 
is supposed to be definitive and controlled by clear and precise rules. If situa- 
tional variation is a problem even here, we must multiply the problem manifold 
for the real world of wastes and situations. 
Formal Science, Informal Science and the Allocation of Authority 
This brief review of the EP test illustrates a fundamental dilemma in the  
use of science for this kind of regulatory instrument. Efficient, optimal and 
defensible risk assessment requires that  methods for measuring risks match 
real risk situations. The wide variability of such situations even for the  major 
single t reatment and disposal method -controlled landfill -would thus require 
the modification of test  methods and experimental parameters to match partic- 
ular cases. This has been widely, and vigorously advocated by industry and 
other. bodies, but such diverse, ad-hoc modifications destroy the  basis of uni- 
form and accountable regulatory management. Furthermore i t  is inherently 
impossible to distinguish between legitimate situation-specific test adjust- 
ments, and adjustments which affect the consistency and reproducibility of the  
tests. 
I t  has been estimated that  developing just one of the  several extraction 
tests  from which the  EP test was chosen cost $1.5 million to one of the central 
research bodies [60]. The EP test is an example of a formalistic caricature of 
science. Its regulatory establishment changed the orientation of research away 
from developing adequate predictive understanding of leaching mechanisms 
under different conditions, towards the more mechanical and relatively 
superficial problems of experimental reproducibility and classification under 
standard conditions artificially defined by an extreme institutional need to 
regulate using science [61]. 
The test represents an expensive attempt to use science to reconcile a 
deeper institutional conflict. The technical conflict between a fictional stan- 
dard situation and widely variable real situations embodies an institutional 
conflict between central, standardised control and industrial autonomy. Cen- 
tral standardisation 'implies that  regulators do not t rus t  industries to devise 
and do their own tests and allow for local factors in a responsible way. 
Apparently, no intermediate position is conceivable in which guidelines are  cen 
trally issued, and uncontrolled industrial autonomy in their use is restrained 
by more substantial local regulatory institutions. These could have a bet ter  
chance of understanding local realities, but still retain and ??? the overall cen- 
tral regulatory philosophy goals and guidelines. The level of uncertainty and 
error in the EP test  and the extent of its shortfall on reality, is a function of the 
resolving power expected of such a test. If i t  is so unreal and little, more 
robust criteria and tests  could defocus from attempted scientific precision, and 
place the curden presently overloading the scientific domain upon adapted 
institutional processes. Analysis of the technical problems therfore reveals 
questions about the institutional s tructure of regulation, (and ultimately about 
political cultures). 
I t  is instructive for comparison to  look a t  a similar test  in the  UK. This is 
the main criterion of toxicity used in the UK t o  define specially controlled 
wastes. The tes t  is 'simply' that  if any 5 cm3 sample of a waste would cause 
acute toxicity ("death or serious tissue damageo) if ingested by a 20 Kg child, it 
is to be designated special waste [62]. Although the  technical basis and the  
arnbi&ity of this test  has been criticized and it has been described as offering a 
potential field day for lawyers [63], i ts institutional role and surroundings in 
the UK system render it relatively uncomplicated to administer. Responsibility 
for case by case interpretation in practical regulation is allocated to the  discre- 
tionary wisdom of government experts advising those with statutory responsi- 
bility for control, -namely local authorities. Although explanatory guidelines 
are offered for advice, these are still rich in the need and opportunity for 
situation-specific judgment, which in principle allows more efficient tailoring of 
regulatory classifications to real-world variations. The remarkably relaxed, col- 
laborative flavor of UK regulation and the non-interventionist stance of central 
bodies is exemplified in the official guidance for evaluating toxicity such as the  
following [64]: 
Where a waste producer does not  have access to  such [suitably 
qualified] staff, guidance may be available from certain of the  larger 
specialist waste disposal contractors: failing this it is suggested tha t  
t h e  waste producers and waste disposal authority (and other parties as 
appropriate, e-g., a water authority) should hold joint discussions to 
establish the  s ta tus  of a particular waste. 
In lacking universal, clear decision rules, the approach thereby offers less 
means of third party access, review and accountability*, but i t  is impressively 
economical in i t s  demands on formal public science. Informal expertise but- 
tressed by institutional arrangements and broad rituals which stress this eli- 
test  "craft" image of scientific expertise in the  UK replace the elaborate public 
use of formal precision and 'public' science in the US. When appeals to formal 
science for authority begin to escalate beyond a certain ill-defined but strongly 
influential (and rather  low) threshold, these are  superceded by implicit, or if 
necessary explicit appeals to accept institutional norms of authority (e.g., 
"competent industries and local authorities acting in good faith should reach a 
socially negotiated consensus which weighs technical judgment with economic 
and other  factors; third parties should accept such consensus as a legitimate 
balance of appropriate expertise and relevant social interests"). It is when 
these fail tha t  major rituals (such as public or parliamentary select committee 
inquiries) reemphasizing such norms are  performed [65]. 
INSlTlWTIONS, FORMAL DECISION RUWS AND INFORMAL JUDGEMENT 
One of the  most rigorous attempts more constructively to define different 
kinds of decision rule in the interpretation of science and policy for RA was tha t  
There are also problems to do with local authority resources, including expertise (see 
Chapter 6). 
of the US NRC Committee on Risk Assessment in the Federal Government [663 
This study proposed a distinction between scientific risk assessment,  risk 
assessment policy, and risk management. Risk management would consider 
the conventional economic, social and other situational factors extrinsic to  sci- 
ence which a re  weighed in decisions upon "acceptable" risk standards. 
Scientific risk assessment means the conventional fields of science unsullied by 
policy considerations. 
The interesting dimension is the  middle one. Here there  a re  often found 
questions of a scientific nature which are  nevertheless strictly unanswerable by 
science, either because of uncertainty due to gaps in science, or to  inherently 
trans-scientific properties of the  issue. Any one of several scientific inference 
bridges o r  decision rules could be legitimately used to reach across the  gaps 
and allow the  construction of policy relevant scientific knowledge - each might 
be consistent with, but not determined by, existing scientific knowledge. Yet 
each may have its own policy implications, so that  t h e  choice of decision rule is 
inevitably partly a policy matter .  A good example is the  choice of extrapolation 
rule for low dose toxicity o r  carcinogenicity effects in humans, when what 
empirical data there is rests  upon high doses, in animals or  sometimes, in 
humans. Choice of a linear, quadratic, linear-quadratic or threshold low dose- 
effect relationship is more or less equally legitimate according to available high 
dose data, but t he  choice often dramatically affects the estimated effects e.g. 
excess cancers,  depending upon the  constants employed. I t  seems to be neces- 
sary for policy to  make an  inference bridge, but which scientific inference rule  
t o  choose a s  "risk assessment policy" is legitimately a mat te r  of policy choice. 
There are many other such examples, with policy implications which vary 
in clarity and importance. The conditions laid down for the  EP t es t  a s  described 
earlier are  also a form of policy mandated scientific decision rule, or  "risk 
assessment policy". In this case the rules are more "blind" in the  sense that  
the choice of standard scientific test condition, e.g., leachate pH, will certainly 
affect the estimated risk and thus, logically, the regulation, but i t  is not clear 
which way it would affect it. In other cases such as low dose-effect extrapola- 
tion, or whether to include benign cancers as effects, t h e  implication of the  
choice for regulation and policy is quite clear. These influences and influence- 
processes whose policy implications are clear are not the  only problem becahse 
a deeper fund exists of those whose policy implications are obscure, or which 
can be changed from obscurity to clarity by normal processes of debate. 
The reasoning behind the  NRC study's proposal formally to  discriminate 
between scientific risk assessment and risk assessment policy, or policy deter- 
mined scientific inference rules,  was to insulate proper science from insidious 
invasion by implicit policy interests and concerns. Thus a new, hybrid arena 
was separately defined with i ts  own norms and principles The choice of infer- 
ence rules would be guided as much as possible by current  science, and scien- 
tists would judge whether the  state of knowledge justified equal policy choice 
between inference options, whether new evidence suggested transfer of such a 
rule out' of the policy domain and into the purely scientific, etc. 
The practical problem with this has already been implied in this chapter. 
As one reaches into science for policy implications, they can be found extend- 
ing deeper and wider. even if - as mentioned - the precise way their policy 
consequences fall becomes less clear-cut. And the solid ground of science free 
from judgments and inferences which are not fully determined by logical rules 
and unambiguous facts recedes as it is closely examined [67] .  The appearance 
of natural  solidity is created by legitimate, institutionalized social agreements 
and judgements of scientists to  ignore unexplained anomalies, t o  resolve an 
ambiguity one way ra ther  than another, etc. Scientists a re  comprehensively 
socialized into particular institutionalized sets of such judgments and infer- 
ences, and thereby become committed to t hem as if they were utterly deter- 
mined by na tu re  and logic. For example, whether benign tumors should be 
counted a s  malignant effects or not depends upon a scientist 's theories about 
the ways in which benign tumors may develop into malignant ones, which may 
correspond with different schools of thought in various disciplines -pathology, 
biophysics, molecular biology, immunology, genetics,  etc. Even whether an  
inference option is in the  "scientific" domain o r  t h e  "risk assessment policy" 
domain is hotly contested. Likewise the different options for human low dose- 
effect extrapolation from short  t e rm,  high dose animal  data  a re  not accepted by 
scientists themselves a s  equally implausible and  thus  open to  equally weighted 
policy choice. 
When one presses each option in detail, one finds each one has i ts  own prol- 
iferating networks of supporting theories, inferences and  a priori methodologi- 
cal commitments  which a r e  supported by deeper level commitments,  and  so on 
in a kind of self-supporting circle [68]. Without some ultimately arbitrary, but  
pragmatically necessary institutional restraint ,  t he  regulatory demands upon 
science in relevant fields for formal justifications pertaining to risk assess- 
men t s  could allow endless encroachment upon scientific judgments by regula- 
tory concerns framed a s  "risk assessment policy" o r  (externally determined) 
"inference rules." Once the  scientific inferential judgments a re  so pervaded by 
policy concerns,  t h e  whole problem orientation a n d  epistemology of a discipline 
may be taken over and  emasculated by regulatory purposes and principles 
determined by a given administrative and political culture.  The formalization 
of decision rules  recommended by the NRC study and  i ts  underlying rationale 
unwittingly risks this kind of encroachment - t he  very process i t  was intended 
to  preempt.  Contrary to the study's faith, there  is nothing inherent  in science 
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to prevent it, but there are different institutional buttresses. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have analyzed the  extent of rnisfit between diversity, 
ignorance, instability and uncertainty surrounding all the various dimensions 
of hazardous waste management, and the need to regulate as if the uncertain- 
ties involved were narrowly limited and thus credibly manageable within unidi- 
mensional, quantitative boundaries. RA as a technical activity is expected to 
reconcile this fundamental contradiction in a way which is credible and author- 
itative to a wide array of different actors and institutions with their own 
interests and perceptions of the issues. 
A balance has to be maintained between too little structuring of the risk 
framework, in response to the authentic unknowns and lack of definition of the  
field, and over-elaborate, artificial bounding of ignorance, in response to 
demands for definitive risk-benefit knowledge by which to  regulate. The former 
emphasis runs the  risk of lack of effective control, and lack of pressure to 
develop consistent technical and evaluative knowledge for regulation; the  lat ter  
runs the converse risk of actually obstructing its zealous search for more pre- 
cise regulatory knowledge. It risks concretizing the artificially created limita- 
tions and standardized frameworks upon the unknowns in the  field as if these 
creations were reality. Although individual regulators may recognize this dis- 
tinction, the system still may be constructed and run as if no such distinction 
existed. 
The strategic aim must be t o  find a dynamic position in which centralized, 
standardized howledge both yields to  its own ignorance and l o c a l  flexibility. 
and also allows room for appropriate adaptation of regulatory standards and 
practices to relevant technical howledge as it  emerges from the existing unk- 
nowns. This is in principle true for all environmental regulation, but the prob- 
lem of finding such a three way balance between: universal knowledge - 
'universal' ignorance - local variations; is exacerbated by the  extra complexi- 
ties and new dimensions of hazardous waste life cycles compared to conven- 
tional pollutant emissions. I t  is important to note than uncertainties due to 
differing perceptions and problem-deflnitions amongst hazardous waste practi- 
tioners enters into all three levels, not only into 'local variation.' Public atti- 
tudes and expectations also interact in complex ways with the above three 
dimensions, so as to further reduce the feasibility space for policy processes 
and options within this domain. 
A major point of this chapter,  embodying what we claim a s  two important 
distinctions in risk assessment of technological systems, is that: 
(i) what is usually regarded as technical uncertainty embodies two funda- 
mentally different kinds of uncertainty; (a) ignorance of deterministic 
events and chains which in principle are knowable but which require 
more extrapolation, calculation, modeling and judgment to make up 
for incomplete knowledge; and (b) genuine indeterminacy in a system. 
This factor takes on extra importance when those components of the  
policy system are autonomous human beings in diverse social and cul- 
tural settings very different from those of analysts or regulators. and 
when they are a prominent, but ill-defined dimension of the overall 
system as they are  especially for hazardous waste. These behavioral 
components although indeterminate, are not arbitrary. 
(ii) apparent technical uncertainty and divergence in risk analysis (and 
science/for policy generally) often masks what are in reality different, 
socially constructed definitions of a technological system. These 
range from detailed 'technical' differences to radically differently 
even contradictory frameworks apparently describing the  same sys- 
tem. The regulatory impulse is t o  regard such uncertainties and 
differences as  purely results of technical immaturity,  to  be resolved 
by more precise, more standardized 'science.' This may be counter- 
productive especially if as is often true, i t  suppresses the recognition 
of diverse equally objective social perceptions and definitions consti- 
tuting a risk-regulatory arena. 
Both these distinctions imply a reconsideration of the balance between 
regulatory emphasis upon science as  a surrogate policeman or arbitrator,  and 
upon complementary institutional mechanisms of mutual  control. compromise 
and  voluntary compliance which' might restrain unrealistic demands for preci- 
sion from science. 
We have emphasized t h e  combination of s t ructural  uncertainties in  the  
real behavioral and technical domain of hazardous waste, with pervasive needs 
for informal judgment in science even in "well-defined fields and "simple" 
tests. However the  objective in emphasizing this point is not t o  suggest tha t  
a t tempts  to  formalize knowledge for regulation in RA frameworks should be 
abandoned. Our aim instead has  been to  emphasize how extremely vulnerable 
is a regulatory process which bases itself upon scientific knowledge unsheltered 
by various institutional supports which expressly or more subtly limit i t s  public 
exposure to  pure scepticism and unrealistic formal criteria of definitiveness. 
The extent and significance of tacit  conflicts and unknowns, the  actively 
strategized na ture  of uncertainties,  and the pervasiveness of informal judg- 
menta l  knowledge within even orthodox well-developed sciences l e t  alone those 
struggling to catch up  with ill-defined environmental and regulation problems. 
m u s t  somehow be articulated in the public dimensions of regulation (and not 
only in intra-expert seminars). Otherwise RA and regulatory authority is easily 
open to  self-destruction when the uncertainties,  conflicts, artificial constructs,  
and non rule-determined conclusions which i t  harbors a re  eventually revealed. 
The degree of elaboration of RA and the  extent  to which i t  remains t rue  to 
underlying unknowns and institutional processes underlying such uncertain- 
ties, is therefore a key parameter in the maintenance of regulatory credibility. 
This is a function of institutional s tructures,  not a matter  only for technical 
judgment. Different balances will of course be s truck in different national set- 
tings with their  characteristic institutional arrangements and cultural styles. 
But a n  underlying constant may be the  internal  contradiction, of public expec- 
tations of central government management and definitive scientific authority 
from regulatory knowledge, which pushes for a standardized RA framework of 
some kind, and expectations of definitive justifications in specific cases, which 
because of t h e  factors mentioned above, often cannot be delivered from tha t  
knowledge. 
I t  is our  argument tha t  the  full significance and complexity of the  interac- 
tions between bureaucratic processes and public expectations and atti tudes - a 
field touched upon but not adequately covered by the new discipline of risk per- 
ception - has yet to be recognized in at tempts to use RA and science to develop 
effective regulation. This will be discussed fur ther  in chapter 7. 
A tentative conclusion of this chapter ,  supported by some policy 
experts in t h e  field [69] .  is t ha t  for this issue a t  least, the variabilities and 
ignorance a re  so great (and intractably so) tha t  at tempts to establish formal 
scientific degree of hazard discriminations a re  likely to result  in ei ther  extra- 
vagant waste of scientific resources for artificial and futile regulatory purposes, 
or severely reduced safety margins due to badly understood real exposure and 
effects mechanisms, or both. 
One possible institutional response to this dilemma is that  examined in 
chapter 6, namely the effective takeover of risk management and evaluation by 
regulatory authorities which are also operators of 'total' T & D systems. Such 
approaches have been long-established for example in Bavaria, Hesse and Den- 
mark, where public authorities in coalition with regulated industries, run cen- 
tral multipurpose facilities which take all waste from the  region. In effect the 
"community" transforms the technical uncertainties by internalizing the risks 
and liabilities into a unitary representative institutional framework of responsi- 
bility. They then effectively reduce risk assessment to routine operating 
management decisions as to which in-plant process a given waste should be 
directed to. 
In the next chapter we examine one important phase of RA for hazardous 
waste in more comparative detail. This is the first and most basic phase of 
most management/policy frameworks, namely the attempt unambiguously to 
define what materials are hazardous wastes. 
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